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The emergence of structure in cooperative relation is studied in a game theoretical model. It is
proved that specific types of reciprocity norm lead individuals to split into two groups. The condition
for the evolutionary stability of the norms is also revealed. This result suggests a connection between
group formation and a specific type of reciprocity norm in our society.
Cooperative behavior can be observed widely in our
society. An important aspect of cooperation is that peo-
ple can maintain mutual cooperation even if they are
faced with social dilemma, which means the situation
that people fail to cooperate although entire coopera-
tion gives better payoff to everyone. Several mechanisms
are pointed out to be important to overcome the social
dilemma, and reciprocity is one of them [1]. Especially
indirect reciprocity (cooperation to someone enhance his
probability to have a cooperative response from others)
is a key when partners of interaction are flexible [3]. It is
necessary for this mechanism to work that people mon-
itor what others do to others and appropriately judge
whom they should cooperate with. Otherwise free riding
behavior spreads and cooperation is abandoned.
Another important aspect of cooperation is that peo-
ple are generally not equally cooperative to all people.
Especially, they often form several groups and cooperate
only inside of the groups, which is called in-group fa-
voritism [2]. To understand in-group favoritism, one can
assume a given group structure and study how coopera-
tion is sustained only inside of the groups [4–6]. In some
cases, however, the group structure itself can be formed
by social interaction of people. For example, groups of
friends or business partners are hardly decided a priori.
Therefore a model to explain in-group favoritism without
exogenous group structure is required.
Here, we study whether group structure of cooperation
is spontaneously formed in a model of indirect reciprocity
with private assessment: each person can have different
opinions on the others’ reputation. Private assessment
model itself has been studied in previous works [7–10].
However their main attention was not the emergence of
group structure but what definition of goodness can evo-
lutionary promote cooperation. In this paper, on the
other hand, the structure of the cooperative relation of
the main interest.
We consider well-mixed N players playing a game,
which is called donation game. The number of players
is assumed to be large, N ≫ 1. The game is repeated
over a large number of rounds. In every round, one player
is randomly chosen as a donor and another player is ran-
domly chosen as a recipient. The donor decides whether
he cooperates or defects. If the donor cooperates, the
payoff of the donor in the round is −c < 0 and that of
the recipient is b > 0. If the donor defects, payoffs of both
players are 0. b and c are called benefit of cooperation
and cost of cooperation respectively. We assume b > c,
which means players are faced with social dilemma.
Each player has his own opinion on each of all players
whether he is good or bad. The donor of each round
decides his action based on his opinion on the recipient
of the round. All players observe who is the donor, who
is the recipient, and what the donor did to the recipient.
Then all players independently revise their own opinion
on the donor based on the observation in the round. A
round ends after all players revise their opinion.
βij(t) ∈ {G,B} represents player i’s opinion on player
j at the outset of round t. If player i has the opinion that
player j is good at the outset of round t then βij(t) = G
and if i has the opinion that j is bad then βij(t) = B. In
this paper, the matrix β(t) = {βij(t)}i,j is called opin-
ion matrix, which was called image matrix in previous
works [9, 10]. Each element of the opinion matrix at ini-
tial round t = 1, is G with probability p and B with
probability 1− p. The probability p is called initial trust
probability and assumed it is not 0 or 1. Note that each
player i also has opinion of himself βii, which can matter
when he is the recipient and revises his opinion on the
donor.
The action matrix γ(t) = {γij(t)}i6=j represents the
action each player will take to each of other players if
they are matched at round t. If i will cooperate with
j, γij(t) = C and we say i is cooperative to j, while
if i will defect against j, γij(t) = D and we say i is
not cooperative to j. Diagonal elements are not defined
since no one plays the game with himself. We omit the
the argument (t) when it is not confusing.
The deterministic map from one’s opinion on the oppo-
nent to the action he will take is called “action matrix”.
Since the number of the possible opinions and that of
possible actions are two, the number of the possible ac-
tion rules are 4 = 22. The four action rules are called
DISC, pDISC, All-C, and All-D, and those who adopt
each action rule are called DISC players, pDISC play-
ers, All-C players, and All-D players, respectively. All-C
players always cooperate and All-D players always do not
cooperate regardless of their opinion on the recipient. In
contrast, DISC players cooperate only when they regard
the recipient as good while pDISC players cooperate only
with bad recipients in their opinion.
Players also adopt certain “assessment rule”, which de-
2TABLE I. Definition of 16 assessment rules (2nd to 5th
columns) and corresponding stationary states of the action
matrix with each assessment rule and DISC or pDISC action
rules (6th and 7th columns). Each element in the 2nd to 5th
columns shows the observer’s new opinion based on his obser-
vation: (recipient’s reputation (G/B), donor’s action (C/D)).
The classification of the state form (a) to (h) is described in
the FIG. 1.
rule (G,C) (G,D) (B,C) (B,D) DISC pDISC
1 B B B B (b) (a)
2 B B B G (e) (a)
3 B B G B (b) (e)
4 B B G G (h) (h)
5 B G B B (b) (a)
6 B G B G (e) (a)/(b)
7 B G G B (g) (g)
8 B G G G (e) (b)
9 G B B B (b) (a)
10 G B B G (f) (f)
11 G B G B (a)/(b) (e)
12 G B G G (a) (e)
13 G G B B (c) (d)
14 G G B G (a) (b)
15 G G G B (a) (b)
16 G G G G (a) (b)
fine their opinions on the donor after observing a game
round. There are 2 × 2 possible combinations of an ob-
server’s opinion on the recipient and the action of the
donor. Therefore, there are 24 assessment rules, which
are denoted type 1 to type 16. The left part of TABLE
I shows the definition of the sixteen assessment rules.
Players do not change their action rule and assessment
rule in repetition of games. In this paper, all players are
assumed to adopt a common assessment rule.
First, we assume all players adopt a common action
rule. Under this restriction, we still have 16× 4 cases for
combinations of an assessment rule and an action rule.
Although the time development of an action matrices is
stochastic and complicated, stationary states exist and
they can be derived rigidly. Then it is proved that all sta-
tionary states can be classified into eight distinct states,
according to the clustering structure of the action ma-
trix. FIG. 1 shows the eight stationary states, which are
denoted state (a) to (h). The sizes of the clusters can
be stochastic variable in some states, however we neglect
the fluctuation since N is assumed to be very large. If all
players in a cluster are cooperative only within that clus-
ter, we call the cluster an exclusive group. Among the
eight states, only state (f) has multiple exclusive groups.
When the action rule is All-C, the stationary state is
(a) irrespective of the assessment rule: all the players
always cooperate with all the others in the end. And
players always only defect each other in the stationary
FIG. 1. Stationary states are shown, by the correspond-
ing action matrices (left in the each panel) and the schematic
diagram of clustering structure (right). Elements of action
matrices are shown with white (cooperative) and black (not
cooperative) pixels. Diagonal pixels are grey since they are
not defined. Matrices shows are sorted to make their struc-
ture easier to see. Circles in schematic diagrams represents
clusters of players. Arrows show players in which cluster are
cooperative to players in which cluster. The fraction of the
size of each cluster over total population is shown in each cir-
cle. The p which appears in the fractions is the initial trust
probability.
state (that corresponds to state (b)) if they adopt All-D
for the action rule. TABLE I shows the stationary states
in the case the action rule is DISC or pDISC. It is worth
stressing that the most interesting stationary state (f),
which has two exclusive groups in it, appears only when
players adopt type 10 assessment rule.
The type 10 assessment rule, which is called Kan-
dori [11] and hereafter denoted as KN, is well studied.
It is well known that KN promotes cooperation if play-
ers always share the same opinion, which is called public
assessment [11–14] It is also known that cooperation is
less promoted by KN in private assessment [9, 10]. How-
ever, it is first pointed out here that KN (and only KN)
cause spontaneously split of players into multiple exclu-
sive groups.
The essence of the derivation of the stationary states is
as the following. Let us focus on the case that the action
rule is DISC or pDISC, since it is trivial that the action
rule All-C yields state (a) and All-D gives state (b). We
first discuss the dynamics of opinion matrices and derive
their stationary structure.
At initial state, the opinions of any two players have
no correlation, therefore disagreements of opinions on
some players almost always exist between any two play-
ers. However, as we will see, agreements among at least
part of players are formed in the repetition of the game.
3Let us consider how (partial) agreement is formed dur-
ing a round. Each player observing a round revises his
opinion on the donor according to the assessment rule,
which is the function of his opinion on the recipient and
the action of the donor. Since the action of the donor is
commonly observed, only the difference in the opinion on
the recipient can cause the difference in the new opinion
on the donor. And some assessment rules, given an ac-
tion of the donor, return the same reputation about the
donor irrespective to the recipient’s reputation. There-
fore, the new opinions of observers on the donor (column
in the opinion matrix in FIG 2) after the round is ei-
ther uniformly good/bad or copy/inversion image of the
observers’ opinion on the recipient.
Under 12 out of 16 assessment rules, at least one of
the actions of the donor (cooperation/defection) deter-
mines the new opinion of the observers irrespective to
their opinion on the recipient. It means that the number
of players on whom all players share the same opinion
can increase. Once all players share the same opinion on
all players, they never disagree about any players after
the round. Therefore, players finally reach and are fixed
to the state that all players share the same opinion on
all players. In such cases, we say all players are in one
opinion group ((1) of FIG. 3).
In contrast, with assessment rule 4, 7, 10 (KN), and
13, only players who share the same opinion on the re-
cipient share the same opinion on the donor. Because
of this process, players who shared the same opinion on
some players can become to share the same opinion on
other players (e.g. when a player on whom they shared
the same opinion play a lot of rounds in series as the
recipient). Finally, members who share the same opin-
ion become same on all players. In other words, players
finally split into two opinion groups and players in dif-
ferent groups have the opposite opinion on all players.
Note, the members of each of the opinion groups are the
members who have the same opinion on a player at the
initial round. At the initial state, every player is regarded
as good by pN players and as bad by (1 − p)N players
on average. Therefore, the size ratio of the two opinion
groups is always p : 1−p. Then, opinion matrices can be
sorted as (2) of FIG. 3.
Now we know whether all players belong to the same
opinion group or they are split into two opinion groups
with size ration p : 1−p, for each assessment rule. We can
also determine the fraction of players who are regarded as
good by themselves for each opinion group, at least if we
fix the action rule. Consider the case the assessment rule
is KN and the action rule is DISC. As mentioned above,
assessment rule KN leads players to split into two opinion
groups. A player cooperate with who is good in his opin-
ion and defect against who is bad in his opinion because
of the action rule DISC. In both cases, he and members
of his opinion group will regard him as good because of
the assessment rule KN. Therefore, the number of play-
ers who are good in their opinion monotonically increase.
FIG. 2. Four possible opinion matrices after a revision.
Elements of opinion matrices are shown with white (good)
and black (bad) pixels. Elements irrelevant with the donor
and the recipient do not affect, therefore they are shown with
grey pixels. (1), (2), (3), and (4) correspond to the situation
that all the players regard the donor as good, the all regard
the donor as good, the all have the same opinion on the donor
and on the recipient, and the all have the opposite opinions
on the donor and on the recipient, respectively. Note that
diagonal elements are also defined since they are not action
matrices but opinion matrices.
FIG. 3. Opinion matrices of players who form (1) one opinion
group or (2) two opinion groups with size ratio p : 1−p. Opin-
ion matrices are shown with white (good) and black (bad)
pixels. Matrices in right hand side are results of sorted to
make their structure easier to see.
Finally, all players are good in their own opinion in both
opinion groups. Similar procedures determine the sta-
tionary state of the opinion matrix for all combinations
of an action rule and an assessment rule.
The stationary states of action matrices are clear from
the action rule and the stationary state of opinion ma-
trices. In the example of KN and DISC, players in each
opinion group regard only those in the same group are
good, therefore they cooperate with only the members
of their opinion group. It directly means that they form
two exclusive groups, with size ratio p : 1 − p, which is
state (f). Other cases go similarly.
Until here, we assumed all players adopt a common
action rule and revealed that players split into two ex-
clusive groups when the assessment is KN and the ac-
tion rule is DISC or pDISC. We finally study whether
the state all players adopt DISC and the state all adopt
pDISC are stable or not under the evolution of action
rules, when the assessment rule is KN. We consider the
case that most of players adopt DISC (pDISC) and a
slight fraction of players, “mutants”, adopt another ac-
tion rule and study whether the DISC players (pDISC
players) get higher average payoff than the mutants. If
4DISC players (pDISC players) get higher average payoff,
DISC (pDISC) is called evolutionary stable strategy [15]
and it suggests the mutants’ action rule do not spread.
Remember that c is the cost which a donor takes to co-
operate and b is the benefit the recipient gains then. We
proved that when the assessment rule is KN, if and only
if the benefit-cost ratio b/c exceeds the threshold(
b
c
)∗
=
1
2
[
1
(2p− 1)
2
+ 1
]
, (1)
DISC and pDISC are evolutionary stable strategies. The
threshold rapidly increases as initial trust probability p
approach 1/2. We will roughly see group separation is
also accountable for this behavior of the threshold.
Consider the case almost all players adopt DISC and
a few mutants adopt All-D. All-D players hardly affect
the relation among DISC players, therefore DISC players
split into two opinion groups with size ratio p : 1 − p as
they do when DISC is the common action rule. DISC
players are cooperative inside of each group and not co-
operative across the groups. When the sizes of the two
groups are more different, the chances for total DISC
players to be matched inside of the groups decrease,
which means fewer chance of cooperation. At the same
time, All-D players gain higher payoff when DISC player
split evenly. Owing to the disagreement between the two
groups, All-D players always have chance to receive co-
operation from either opinion groups. If an All-D player
defect against a player in an opinion group, the opin-
ion group regards the All-D player as bad, however the
other opinion group regards him as good. If two opinion
groups’ sizes have a very large difference, All-D players
almost always defect against members of majority group,
therefore most of All-D players can receive cooperation
only form the small minority group. This is why DISC
players’ payoff can exceed All-D players’ even with lower
b/c, if p is further from 1/2. The case of pDISC goes
similarly.
Our results show that in-group favoritism occurs based
on the spontaneously formed group structure, even with-
out exogenous group structure. Moreover, the separa-
tion into groups is caused by mutual assessment, which
usually play a key role to overcome social dilemma. Es-
pecially, it is surprising and interesting that KN, one of
the best assessment rules to promote cooperation under
public assessment, causes group separation under private
assessment. This connection between the people’s defi-
nitions of goodness and their group structure might be
experimentally and empirically testable.
Extension of our model may enable us to understand
not only completely separated two groups but also more
complex and various group dynamics in our society. For
example, if we consider more complex assessment rules,
with which observers take their original opinion on the
donor into consideration, more than tow exclusive groups
can be formed.
Formation of opinion groups plays the crucial role in
the derivation of stationary state. This analysis based on
opinion groups can be applied to the system with small
error and the case assessment rules are different among
players, which enables, for example, analysis of evolution
of assessment rules.
In conclusion, it was revealed that players split into two
exclusive groups by specific types of reciprocity norm and
that the norms can be evolutionary stable. This can be
an explanation of why people frequently form groups and
cooperate only inside of the groups.
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